

Interviewer: Clay Whitehead interview, December 16<sup>th</sup>, 1992. Okay. Perhaps we could begin by your explaining what exactly your responsibilities were in the Office of Telecommunications Policy and how the PBS issue related to other things like cable and so forth and so on.

Clay Whitehead: Before we do that

Interviewer: Oh, okay.

Clay Whitehead: I've got to give you a kind of a general disclaimer that I've got a terrible flu thing. The flu symptoms aren't bad, but the mind is substantially gone. So, if I don't make sense or what have you, maybe you can come back another day and try it again then.

Interviewer: Okay. All right. .

Clay Whitehead: I mean I'm game to go ahead.

Interviewer: Okay.

Clay Whitehead: I'm just warning you I'm not hitting on all cylinders today. Secondly, could you give me a little background of what you're doing and what you want to accomplish?

Interviewer: I'm doing a, I have a grant from the Bradley Foundation and I'm doing a book on PBS, for viewers like you who question mark PBS in the American mind, which they're critical you know. I'm doing a "what's behind the scenes" about PBS type of book. And, you're one of the major figures, you know that they sort of curse when they mention your name, the PBS types.

And so, you know, I thought that probably you've had more influence on PBS than anybody except Bill Moyers and Douglas Cater I guess. And so, it seems Douglas Cater and Bill Moyers won't talk to me so, it'll be good to get it straight from the horse's mouth, so to speak. So.

Clay Whitehead: Okay.

Interviewer: And I also, I don't, I don't know why I didn't bring it with me, but I work with David Horowitz, Collier and Horowitz, watchdogs you know. They wrote this newsletter called Comet (sp?) which is a Watchdog PBS thing, and so, I can send you copies of it.

Clay Whitehead: What did David Horowitz do?

Interviewer: He was not the Consumer Reporter but the, on second thought, former radical now neo-conservative – we have the Rockefellers, the Kennedys, the Fords, he edited ramparts, now he edits heterodoxy.

Clay Whitehead: Okay, where do you want to start?

Interviewer: Okay, we could start just at the beginning. In other words, how did PBS fit into the overall telecommunications picture? I mean the Nixon administration was trying to effect change; cable came in, etcetera, etcetera.

Clay Whitehead: I first got involved in this when the Nixon administration came into office. For the first two years of the Nixon administration I was Special Assistant to the President, and the Office of Telecommunications Policy didn't exist. That was back in the days when the White House was still fairly small.

My responsibilities, like everyone, I think, just kind of evolved. I was responsible for NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, NSF, and a kind of a grab-bag of general economic issues and regulatory issues. My own academic background in the area, I guess, I guess you would say policy analysis. So, I guess because I knew about it, a little bit about it, telecommunications issues tended to come to me; the FCC issues came to me.

We inherited a couple of significant things from the Johnson administration. One was the report of a commission headed by Walt Rostow, called informally The Rostow Report, which was a look at the corporate communications and some recommendations about policy development, what the government should be doing about new technologies and that sort of thing.

That report was completed during the Johnson administration but not released. So, it fell to us to, you know, receive the report, digest it, do something with it. It had a few good ideas in it. In fact, more than a few, and one of the ideas was the creation of an agency, like the Office of Telecommunications Policy, to provide someone who could, in the executive branch, who could oversee the development of communications policy and also oversee the federal government's own extensive telecom activity.

That was one of the recommendations that we picked up and recommended to the Congress: the establishment of that office, and I was ultimately named to be the head of, of that part of the Cabinet. The other major thing we inherited from Lyndon Johnson was the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. It had been established and had its initial funding in the last years of the, in fact, *the* last year of the Johnson administration.

You'll have to forgive me some of my chronology.

Interviewer: Actually, that's very helpful for me; it helps me to focus on this.

Clay Whitehead: And as I recall, the, the initial funding in that first year was thirty-five million dollars. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting was created pursuant to the vision of the report of the Carnegie Commission. And so, there was a vision for, which that Carnegie Commission report provided, for what CPB was going to become.

There was, at the same time, this rather ragtag group of educational broadcasters who held television-radio licenses throughout the country for educational television, and that was kind of thrown in there, too. So, we faced the question of what, what is CPB going to do? What is its role *vis-à-vis* the local educational broadcaster and what kind of funding should be put in place?

I was the liaison between the White House and that crowd of people. It, it became clear, I'm probably jumping over too much here, but it became clear in talking to Frank Pace, who had been the Chairman of CPB, and Mac Bundy, who had some role, but I'm not quite exactly sure what it was.

Interviewer: Who had a [unintelligible] maybe.

Clay Whitehead: The two of them were in to see me with some regularity, and it was very clear what their vision was. It was to create a fourth national television network which would be programmed by CPB in the same way that NBC programs the NBC television network. The local stations would be basically reduced to the role of affiliates carrying the programming that CPB created.

The funding would come from the federal government. The funding would be ten to twenty or thirty times the thirty-five million dollars that were initially appropriated -- hundreds of millions of dollars. And that that funding would be provided through a mechanism that was essentially automatic and independent of any oversight responsibility the government might have.

So, they think what they ideally would have liked was something like the BBC tack, which is just automatically pouring money, dedicated money, into their coffers. But the, the concept going at the time was long-term funding: five, ten, twenty years kind of appropriation and the authorization that would guarantee them large budgets to develop and distribute the programming and insulate them from the oversight of the federal government.

Interviewer: You said Bundy was in to see you frequently, this is something I'll have to track down. When he came in was he, why, why was he there, you know? And what was his position?

Clay Whitehead: Well, I, I, his position was to, to basically argue for the funding, both the mechanism and the amount of funding, for this, for CPB. I remember one meeting in particular where I told him that I thought that the Nixon administration was almost certainly not going to go along with anything like the levels of funding that he was talking about.

And moreover, that I was bothered by this principle of insulation from political influence, because there was a legitimate need for the government to fulfill it's responsibility of overseeing how public funds are used. And I thought that, you might call it a dilemma, between some kind of journalistic independence, programmatic independence, and federal oversight was a kind of paradox that presented some, some tough issues.

And it's not enough just to wave the Carnegie Commission Report and say, "This is good and this is true and everything... Trust us, and everything will be fine." That we would, we would have to struggle with those issues to find some, some funding mechanism that was a sensible compromise among all the competing interests and considerations.

And he was, I don't know if he was quite impressed enough; we just hoped that he would pick up the enthusiasm. My recollection was that that was fairly early on and kind of set the tone really for the rest of our interaction with the position.

Interviewer: Was there the sense already, though, that Bundy had more of a corporate issue, instead of a "Kennedy government in exile" waiting to come back? Or . . .

Clay Whitehead: No, I don't remember any of that. It was, it was just that he was a friend of the board of CPB. I think he may have been on the board, I don't remember, but there was a very clear sense in the Nixon White House that politically, these were not friends. But, you know, then there were lots of elements and organizations in society that were not friends, and you deal with them. Life goes on. So, there was not a, that, that really wasn't the approach.

Interviewer: Did he threaten at any point to bring any political pressures to bear or anything from his side or was he just there talking? I mean was there ever any, I mean, because I've seen some of the documentation and stuff like I mean, and, and we've heard the PBS side all these years. But what about you know, the other side, from inside the administration? You know funding and that sort of constellation around him? Did they ever you know, threaten you or anything like that? No?

Clay Whitehead: No.

Interviewer: So, how did he try and sell this idea?

Clay Whitehead: Motherhood and apple pie.

Interviewer: Oh, I see.

Clay Whitehead: Oh, it was, it was educational. It was going to provide, it was going to finally let the television medium escape from the banal effects of commercial broadcasting. Let it realize its true potential. Create programming of significant cultural and artistic merit, which we didn't have, like they did in Great Britain. It was an embarrassment to our country. We were a great country, and we had an obligation to foster these kinds of things.

Interviewer: And that was a line he would give to you, for instance?

Clay Whitehead: Well, I'm, I'm not even paraphrasing, I'm just giving you kind of the general philosophy. That, that was the line: that this is a good thing culturally and educationally for our country.

Interviewer: There is a number of people tell me that the real impetus behind public broadcasting was the NAB and the desire not to have more competition on the broadcast band, and that this would use up spectrum space in a noncompetitive manner? Was that something that you were aware of at all or . . . ?

Clay Whitehead: No. To the extent that was a, an issue, that would have been way back before the time, when the educational, when station frequencies were allocated specifically for education. In most of the major markets, in fact most markets, there was a specific reservation for public television. In

some of the bigger markets it was VHF, and where that wasn't available it was UHF. But those issues were behind this market .

But you, you did have the, these educational broadcasters, and they were pumping out education colleges, university types of . . . . So, it, it was clear to me very early on that what CPB wanted to do was to co-opt the fragmented educational bumpkin that had these licenses and soon feed them programming, which they would carry, because I guess they were watered down or inspired or what have you. But it was very much a top-down concept.

CPB would, would provide the programming and these people would carry it. And that was one of the themes that I tried to tease out into the open. Early on in the -- I gave a speech, the details of which I have forgotten, but I gather lives on in the public broadcasting circuit, where I went public with the dichotomy that, on the one hand we had an educational broadcasting establishment that was focused on providing education with each station providing the educational programming with the best of whatever they were about, whether they were university-based or community-based.

And over here on the other hand, we had a group of people who wanted huge sums of money and were intending to develop and distribute a full network schedule, not of educational programs but of public television programs, which meant news, public affairs, entertainment, drama, and it was aimed at building a much bigger audience than educational television.

And so I, in the speech I said, "What are you? Are you educational programmers, educational broadcasters who will help pick and choose amongst the programs that are being put out by this CPB, or are you the



local network affiliate that doesn't have anything to say about it and just carries whatever is said from the CPB headquarters in Washington?"

Well, it was rather unremarkable to me that that issue should be discussed, but clearly CPB viewed it as a throwing down of the gauntlet, and they immediately took the line that I was trying to divide the public broadcasting community. And really from, from day one there was a, just like, I can't trace it exactly but I remember a year or two ago Jesse Jackson said, "We aren't blacks anymore; we're African-Americans." And the press just immediately toed the line and henceforth the discussion about race in this country was focused on African-Americans. That was the term that was used. There wasn't an exact date but, you know, right around this time the whole idea, the whole concept of educational television just went away. That was the dull, boring professor at the blackboard just writing the equations.

And what we were about was the bright and shining future of public broadcasting. And the, the whole agenda became overnight, now it was public broadcasting. And it, the concept, found favor in you know, a lot of places in the body politic. The press kind of liked it, the art history community kind of liked it, the big public broadcasting stations liked it, because they were going to be places for these programs to be viewed.

So, the, the infrastructure if you will, the educational broadcasting infrastructure was essentially co-opted by the public broadcasting crowd. There were later some struggles, but, by and large, the tune was, and still is, called by CPB.

Interviewer: One of the things that came up in this whole thing, though, is that public broadcasting seeing Nixon as an enemy, and of course, the great pleasure in broadcasting the Watergate hearings, you know, gavel-to-gavel coverage, you know, and so forth. And Al Vecchione produced it and

now he produces McNeil/Lehrer, and the whole Ford Foundation funding of NCPAT or whatever it was, National Center for Public Affairs Television and, you know, we've seen the inflation of Sander Vanocur's salary and Robert McNeill and so forth and so on.

We were just comparing things in the Bush administration, where we couldn't get any executive-level interest in this whole PBS issue with the Nixon administration where there clearly was the sense that the President was concerned and Johnson was concerned, as well, because I've seen the LBJ Library stuff on that.

How much... in terms of your own work restructuring broadcasting altogether, the networks I mean, one of the things that I always thought – this was my own analysis when I wrote a dissertation on *Masterpiece Theater* – was, the real story of the Nixon administration was cable television and making that possible. And that was the real victory. And that really did bring diversity, and that was a conscious policy.

There was a memo, I guess from Peter Flanigan, it was to you. It was something that you can take ten to fifteen years before you're going to see any results with this or something, you know. And it was true. And the networks just dropped it. Was there any, how did you put the public broadcasting issue which the press was so concerned with? Was it a diversion from what was really going on with cable television or what was the relationship there?

Clay Whitehead: No, it wasn't a diversion, it was just, it was just in the air, you know. It was an issue that had to be dealt with, and so we dealt with it. But, but it was, it was not the central kind of issue that cable television was. You're absolutely right about that. I'm leafing through here, because I know I have a graph that really shows it.

Interviewer: And what about the political use of public broadcasting and the elite? You know, the media elite or whatever you want to call them. Mobilizing public opinion and so forth?

Clay Whitehead: I just happen to have this.

Interviewer: Oh, great. Wow.

Clay Whitehead: Keep that if you want.

Interviewer: Oh, I would like that, that's terrific.

Clay Whitehead: I talked with someone else about that just the other day, and that chart there, just to see what it would look like. Well, you're absolutely right. My, I had, when I went in, that's the reason I went to OTP with, with some real reservations. Because I didn't see myself as a communications specialist, and I didn't want to get in my career stereotyped as a guy who just did communications.

I enjoyed the White House. Why did I want to move? But I became convinced that we were at a, I'm not sure a crossroads, we were at a point of, where there was a lot of, a lot of issues were coming to a head. We were at a point where there was a, we were, I guess we were approaching a fork in the road -- I'm struggling to find the right kind of metaphor or simile -- in two respects: the monopoly of ATT over telecommunication services and equipment was really becoming oppressive, and there were some, I thought there were some opportunities to firm up competition.

And those, those were in things like something called foreign attachment -- the idea that people could plug their own devices into the telephone jacks, whereas AT&T was regularly lobbying me that you couldn't allow anyone, any equivalent made by anyone other than ATT to plug into the

telephone jack, because it would electrocute their workers. So, and also, MCI was just getting started. So, there, there were, there were technologies, and there were little ragtag efforts to establish competition with Ma Bell, and Ma Bell kept saying, “But we’ve got to preserve the monopoly, because it does all these wonderful things for the country as a whole, and besides it’s a natural monopoly.”

And I kept saying, “Wait a minute, if you’re a natural monopoly, then you don’t need protection from competitors, because they can’t survive. And you’re telling me you want me to protect you from them, that doesn’t sound like a natural monopoly. So, I, I thought the whole idea of introducing competition into the telecommunications marketplace was tremendously important.

And I, that was one thing that got me sucked into this. The other was in broadcasting. I thought that it was not healthy that the viewing audience was concentrated in three networks. And that the struggle and regulation of television and the domination of a, of television by a particular point of view, a particular perspective, was inextricably tied up with the fact that we, we had a structure which guaranteed the monopoly of those three companies.

And all of the argumentation about how we ought to regulate them were copyright issues and there were all kinds of issues from the networks, and the studios, and the local affiliates, and it just went on and on and on. So, all of that was just symptomatic of the fact that we had too much economic concentration in those three companies, and the only way to get out of that problem was to open up more outlets, so that there would be true competition. I often likened it to the change that happened in the magazine business. Before you were born, the magazine business was dominated by *Life Magazine*, *The Saturday Evening Post*, and *Collier’s*.

And now, you go down to the drugstore and look at the magazine rack.  
My God!

So, the, the idea of, of promoting competition in television broadcasting to create more diversity, to give, give the viewer more choice was very compelling, and cable television was clearly the way that was going to happen. So, my two main missions when I was at OTP were to promote competitive policies that ultimately led to one ATT lawyer working with me and conspiring with the Attorney General to re-open the antitrust case to break up AT&T.

Interviewer: Now, that began in the Nixon administration? I didn't realize that.

Clay Whitehead: No, most people don't. Every, the whole, that was, that was towards the end. ATT, it's hard to remember now, to appreciate now how tremendously powerful ATT was politically at that time. And what I was, I was active and visible in promoting the idea of competition, but my work with Justice was done very discreetly and very quietly behind the scenes.

Because I, I took the position which Justice, of course, very much wanted. I was not there to comment on whether or not ATT had violated any anti-trust laws. "But if, Mr. Attorney General, you decide that they have and you want to prosecute it, then here are some remedies that you can ask for." And I think our biggest contribution was to get Justice away from their fixation on splitting ATT up, in terms of splitting service off from manufacturers.

They had the idea that a combination of the service entity and the manufacturing entity was what was causing the problems. And I argued persuasively that the problem was in the monopoly of the service organization and that the, indeed, the manufacture of electronic

equipment, telecom equipment, was already competitive and who cared about who built the equipment? It was, it was the control over the local loop that gave them the monopoly, and what you needed to separate off was the control of the local loop from the long distance carriage and the manufacturers.

Interviewer: So, it was exactly the same model you were applying to PBS?

Clay Whitehead: Correct. So, we, my contribution, in that was not the decision to reopen the case but to give Saxby some comfort that if he did reopen it, which he wanted to do, that there, there were remedies that would be constructive and would not cause, as ATT said, the downfall of the only great telephone system in the world.

Anyway, that, those were the things that got me involved, and public television was always the, the albatross, the mill stone, call it what you will, around my neck. I thought it was important. I spent a lot of time and intellectual energy dealing with it. But it was not on my critical path.

Interviewer: Why do you think it became so important? I mean, was it the political connections of the Democratic Party or is there something else going on?

Clay Whitehead: No, I don't think it was Democratic *per se*. Let me just close off this area we've been talking about. The only connection that I remember thinking about at the time between these broader issues of where the country is going in telecomm and the public broadcasting issue, was thinking that the concept of the Carnegie Commission was very rooted in a particular industry structure: that television was going to be distributed over the air; there were a finite number of outlets; the three television, commercial television networks dominated the audience; the only way to get good programming of an alternative nature was to establish a nonprofit alternative to the big three. And that static structure was going to

continue. And therefore you needed to pump very large sums of money into this public broadcasting system to counterbalance the commercial broadcasting system.

And my concept clearly was much longer term, much different which is, to use a metaphor let a thousand flowers bloom. If you've got lots of channel outlets, then the programming will, will follow. And setting up a huge corporation for public broadcasting with huge subsidies from the federal government that basically couldn't be touched was just going to create a monster that at some point in the future was going to be unnecessary.

Or, at least not necessarily on that concept and that field. So, I thought CPB as being one, relatively small source of what would be an increasingly diverse mix of television programming that would become available. And part of the reason that I fought so hard to keep the funding level down, dollar amount down, was to avoid creating something that I didn't think we still needed, but certainly in the future would be inappropriate. But that was the only real connection between the cable broadcasting arena, the policy, and the, these CPB issues, in my mind.

Interviewer: Well, I mean there was a time just, as I said, public broadcasting was out to get Nixon. I mean that was, I mean it's in memos.

Clay Whitehead: Now, now you're getting to one of the great....

Interviewer: I mean they feel they got Nixon, quite honestly, I mean, you know.

Clay Whitehead: Oh, sure. Sure. Clearly, many people in public broadcasting were violently anti-Nixon. But just as clearly, many people in the Nixon White House were violently anti-public broadcasting. Bob Haldeman and Chuck Colson in particular, just had a visceral hatred. Turn on any kind

of television programming that was coming out of CPB or some of these PBS stations, you know, it was waving, waving a red flag at them.

There, there was in the White House, in the Administration, this serious discussion about what's the right role for CPB versus the local stations? What kind of funding mechanisms can you put in place that will provide some insulation from the political process but not too much, and so forth? On the other hand, there was the, what I would call the call the Colson-Haldeman antagonism that saw the CPB programming as, as politically active and hostile.

And they generally viewed it on a, an episodic basis. You know, that particular comment on that particular program last night. They did not, I mean, there were enough incidents like that, that they generally saw CPB and PBS as the enemy politically and were always viscerally prepared to just you know, zero it out and forget about it. But they never, they never persevered with the political intent to do that.

Interviewer: Why not? That's a good question -- why didn't they just zero it out? It's an LBJ thing. It's small. We can kill it now before it grows.

Clay Whitehead: I don't know. I don't know. There was some of that discussion. And my argument was look, educational television exists. Most of the programming we're seeing on CPB is produced by the big five, or the big seven educational programmers -- now public broadcasters. That programming is going to be with us, whether we like it or not.

They are going to get money. They'll get it from Ford Foundation; they'll get it in grants from various federal agencies. I mean, it's here, and it's going to stay. And if we, if we just, if we try to kill it, it's only going to hurt politically, and it's going to forestall the setting up of the system and the funding mechanisms and all that in a formative way.



And when the Democrats get back in, as we know they will, then they'll just go pick up where they were. So, my argument was, let's keep it small. Let's put in place some constructive checks and balances on the funding. And try to shape, constrain this thing, and shape this thing, so that there are checks and balances that aren't coming from us.

Because if, if we are, we set up a system, for example, there is always talk about, "we'll flip back the board." You know, we'll put our guys on the board, and then look at pro-Nixon programming. And I kept saying guys, the Democrats can play that game better than we can. And if that's the model we want, where we stack the board politically with our guys who try to use, who then try to use their position on the board to produce programming, Democrats are going to take that model, and come back in four years or six or eight years and do it in spades. What we want to do is to create structural checks and balances. That view inevitably, I mean, that view eventually prevailed. And so, the, that accounts for the approach I took in developing our policy.

Interviewer: Now, at what level...? Was this just Haldeman or did the President make that decision? What was the chain of command? Actually who did you report to?

Clay Whitehead: I reported to Peter Flanigan, who reported to the President. But the White House was... In that White House there wasn't, there was a chain of command, but ideas flowed both horizontally and vertically.

Interviewer: Did the President actually make a decision to go with your idea? Maybe that...?

Clay Whitehead: Yeah, yeah.

Interviewer: Because I know Nixon was interested because he wrote me a nice letter. When my backgrounder came out, I sent him a copy and he commented, you know, when I was at Heritage. I mean he obviously was interested in public broadcasting issues.

Clay Whitehead: Oh, very much. He was very interested in all these issues. He, he was a, a fascinating guy. One of the, one of the things that he very much believed in, which of course no one in press would even print it, is, he firmly believed that there should be a separation between the government and the media. I mean, a brick wall. That the government shouldn't be in a position to manipulate the media.

So, when I was proposing the deregulation of radio broadcasting, when I was promoting cable television or promoting various other things, and television broadcasting, that were very, very deregulatory, you know, remove the government's levers over television broadcasting and radio broadcasting -- it was inappropriate. He was always right there. Thought that was great.

At the same time, as I learned later from reading the transcripts and tapes, he was telling Chuck Colson to, you know, go try to get Kay Graham's licenses revoked. So, he was not the least bit above using those levers of power for his immediate tactical, political gain.

He was clearly willing to do that. But at the same time, when you presented him with a policy issue of, should these levers be there or shouldn't they be there, he would always say, "No, they shouldn't be there. You know, they should pull back."

Interviewer: But as long as they're there, I'm going to use them.

Clay Whitehead: Right. And, and I think that is a, that in many ways was a very fundamental difference between the way he and, I think, I and a number of other people look at these issues, and the way what I would call the liberals would have it. Let's, my view is, let's remove the opportunity, let's remove the government inter... involvement and interference, and create a marketplace of ideas and a marketplace of economics with the checks and balances in the body politic, and, when you do that, it provides the checks and balances.

The more liberal view, I think, is the government ought to be in there enforcing that. Government ought to have controls over these, over these television broadcasters, ought to have control over cable television to make sure that the kind of programming is what we want and should have there. Which, when you stop to think about it, is a very anti-First Amendment point of view. So, you get these liberals preaching the First Amendment, but on the other hand, trying to extend the levers of the government control, which I think is just internally inconsistent.

And anyway, that, our, our, let's say I, I eventually prevailed, and our policy on public broadcasting basically was let's go for multi-year funding, not, not for a permanent structure, but every five years or so we'll have an authorization. That way the government can exercise its appropriate oversight of how funding is allocated.

Interviewer: So you actually agreed that this is.... Under Johnson this was still a one-year authorization.

Clay Whitehead: Yeah. Well, I was . . .

Interviewer: Was this before or after the 1972 veto of the . . . ?

Clay Whitehead: This was before.

Interviewer: So, they had already agreed to multi-year funding?

Clay Whitehead: I, I . . .

Interviewer: Is that a deal you worked out?

Clay Whitehead: I don't.... Yeah, it was basically a deal, and I, I can't tell you now. I think it was my idea. I think it was my deal. I can't really tell you who I struck the deal with, but basically the point of view that I sold was, look, we will have long-term funding which is not the same as permanent funding. It is not in our interest to have annual appropriations, because Democrats control the Congress. Congress will meddle in this far more effectively and dangerously than we ever will.

So, annual appropriations and authorizations just invite the fox into the chicken coop and invite all kinds of collaboration that we don't want. It really does intermix the government and the, the broadcast media in an unhealthy way. We shouldn't have that. On the other hand, because of what's happening in cable television, and because of blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, we don't want to set up here something that we can't change for thirty years either. So, let's go with something like five-year funding.

And let's insist that the local stations have a significant role. Let's make sure that some of that money goes to the local stations so that they can stand up to CPB and say, "No, we don't want that; we want this."

Interviewer: Now, Scalia was working in your office?

Clay Whitehead: Sure, sure.

Interviewer: Because I saw an interview.... I, I used in one of my speeches where he actually said you could have structured the whole thing differently without a single program service. With multiple, multiple services feeding the system and serve a smorgasbord where the local stations could pick and choose. Was that the original intent of what you were doing?

Clay Whitehead: No, that was one of the ideas that we talked about. Wanting to, I think you could go to the extreme, and say, all of the federal money goes to the local stations. And then they can pool the money; they can create their own programming. They can pool it and create programming and they can feed that out to the other local broadcasting stations, and they can carry it or not carry it.

Well, the, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the big public stations hated that idea because they wanted to control. So, their argument was you can't just give money to local stations, because they'll just keep it and they'll put it away, and they won't really pool it and create high-quality programming. That can only be done by an organization with an appropriately grandiose, elegant concept of what the American people need, and that can only be CPB, working in concert with the big stations that have the capability to produce the high-quality stuff. And the guy in Keokuk doesn't have that and never will have that, and he's just a country bumpkin and if you give the money to him it's gone. So, our compromise was to ensure that some money went to the local stations, which they, of course, were free to turn right around and give back to CPB or to pool, however they wanted to do it. They could, they could stage like WGBH if they wanted to.

And so, that was basically the concept of five-year funding. You got some political oversight for what's going on here and what the level of funding is. Create PBS, makes sure some of the money goes there. Create checks

and balances within the system so that the national organization can't have its will.

Interviewer: Now, PBS was something that was part of your compromise? It was something you agreed to?

Clay Whitehead: Yes.

Interviewer: And the idea was to, I mean originally I, I know that NET wanted that role and the White House didn't want that.

Clay Whitehead: Right.

Interviewer: But what was the idea of.... Why PBS? What was the advantage of setting up PBS, which to me...? I don't see the difference between PBS and NET. But, but maybe you could explain that.

Clay Whitehead: I think the only difference was the timing. We didn't like the idea of a nationally programmed network. And so arguing against NET was arguing against them. But, as time went on, it became clear, because of the discussion I just went through, that we had to have the local stations playing a role in the programming. And so, PBS was set up as the collective, if you will, of the local stations.

It wasn't so much that we wanted to see PBS the network, we didn't conceive of PBS, at the time, as the network, the way you see the logo on the screen today. We saw it, PBS, as the counterbalancing of lobby and voice to CPB.

Interviewer: So, actually you're one of the fathers of PBS, too.

Clay Whitehead: Fair enough.

Interviewer: And your vision of PBS was a market place? So, what was, how did you see it operating?

Clay Whitehead: It was the House of Representatives, if you will, to the CPB as President.

Interviewer: Oh, I see, a Constitutional model, actually.

Clay Whitehead: Yeah. And not, not explicitly but basically it was let... you know, power to the people. Let's give some power to the individual elements of the system, which are in that spread around geographically, their interests are spread. Let's, let's give some power there to counterbalance this single national power. And then, you know, encourage a mechanism for them to deal with one another. So, CPB has to deal with PBS in order to get its programming carried.

PBS has some influence in telling CPB what they want. But it was a, it was a creation, if you will, trying to put some backbone in the local broadcasting.

Interviewer: So, you didn't envision it as an actual network?

Clay Whitehead: No.

Interviewer: So, how did that happen? Was it taken over by the Ford Foundation or what exactly? Because the Ford Foundation ran NET pretty much. I mean....

Clay Whitehead: Right.

Interviewer: ...and in Los Angeles they actually kicked USC out of what became KCEP, you know, put their own people in and stuff like that. The

question is, how did, how did you play a role in all of, you know what transpired, I guess, in, in, in, was it their setting up of NPAC which was the key to their, do you know what I mean?

I mean, I don't know how involved you were in the minutiae but, in other words, if your idea was you'd have this representative, the House of Representatives, that would, you know, very high-minded concept it seems, you know. How did that become...?

Clay Whitehead:

No. It wasn't at all high-minded. It was, it was just a, a grabbing for something that would create, I keep using the idea of checks and balances, something that would create a systemic check on what would otherwise be the unbridled power of CPB. And because it was clear that what CPB and the big five wanted was a national network feed that they would provide and everyone else would take. And they would not be answerable to the local broadcaster. They would not be answerable to the government. They would not be answerable to advertisers. They would only be answerable to their concept of the greater good. And, you know, I don't think there's anyone in the world, except me, that's qualified to take that kind of position. [laughter]

So, if you say we're not going to do zero it out and kill it, you've got to find some kind of compromises to make sure that the thing is answerable in some way, however imperfectly, to the American people. Now, I did not think that station manager in Tucson, or the station manager in Topeka was necessarily the most enlightened guy to be deciding what kind of programming we are to produce.

But I thought that all of those guys collectively ought to have a say. Because that would, that would force some reasonableness and some sanity and answerability on CPB that otherwise it wasn't going to get.



Interviewer: Now, if we can get down to cases. I mean, there was, you know, the flap over Sander Vanocur's salary and you know the idea that, I mean, some things obviously got just some people in the White House very mad. You know that, what the heck was going on here? I mean, can you talk a little bit about that at all? I mean is that something that you know?

Clay Whitehead: I frankly don't know that I remember the details. I remember all the issue of the salaries. We, we kept trying to.... I kept trying, both inside the White House and in my private dealings with the public broadcasting crowd and in public, to try to get some of these things, some of these issues out. We... and one of the issues was what are you? Are you government? Are you not government?

If, if you're being a hundred percent funded by the government, shouldn't the people have some right to see how you're running your affairs and what have you? And one of the themes that was going on very clearly was that they had it in mind that certain people would make very high salaries like the people did at the three commercial networks. After all, you had to have talent, right? You have to be able to *pay* someone.

Never mind that, you know, by setting yourself up to compete for onscreen talents with commercial networks, you were, in essence, buying the same kind of talent that the three commercial networks already had.

Interviewer: Oh, so you're saying you're not really into alternatives?

Clay Whitehead: Yeah, I mean basically, I don't want to be too harsh about it, but to some extent CPB ended up with the also-rans from the three commercial networks. And if you had the choice of being an anchorman at NBC or anchorman at PBS which would you choose? Well, if you've been taken out of the running, you didn't get the job at NBC, maybe you'll do it at PBS.

But in any event, I think they went too far in trying to, to popularize their programming and attract audiences. They inevitably were copying the organizations that they said they were trying to be an alternative to. But, that's another issue. So, one question was, why are we creating a kind of quasi-governmental body here that has its Board appointed by the President and so forth and so on where we're paying people more than we're paying the President of the United States? What's going on here?

Well, they didn't want that discussed. It was just that simple. And we thought that would be a healthy thing to have out in the open.

Interviewer: But when it was discussed I mean there was....

Clay Whitehead: No, I'll talk to him.

[End of Part 1 / Begin Part 2]

Interviewer: Comfortable?

Clay Whitehead: Hmm.

Interviewer: But let's look a little bit at the political part of it. I mean one of the things that was said by Irving Kristol and other people, you know, was that if PBS had just stuck to music, culture, drama, etcetera, there wouldn't have been an issue with the public affairs and the news and the slants of the news that was the issue.

Clay Whitehead: Well, it wasn't the issue. It was the hot press issue, and it was the hot political issue. But I think you can see from what we've been discussing here, that there were other less glamorous but nonetheless substantial issues that . . .

Interviewer: Were you involved with the Prime Time Access Rule decision thing?

Clay Whitehead: Yeah, but the politics and the public affairs were clearly what caused the, the most violent emotions. I, one of the, one of the themes that I tried which went absolutely nowhere, I remember what I was trying to do was to structure some kind of a compromise, structural compromise, so that we could get on with this thing but not let it get out of hand.

And one of my suggestions was that we set up a, that Public Broadcasting set up a kind of Chinese Wall and federal funds would not be used for public affairs programs. Not hard to imagine some kind of structure like that in practice. Of course, it would not be perfect, but it would at least deal with a, a big part of the problem. I thought, maybe, maybe I was naïve, but at the time I thought it was a pretty good idea, but when I proposed it, which I did in a speech according to congressional testimony – I've forgotten exactly – but when I raised the idea of publicly, it was immediately turned into the principal that the President wanted and the Nixon administration wanted to eliminate public affairs on public broadcasting. And I'll tell you, that was one of the most eye-opening experiences I've had about the power of the media, where in, in the face of a very clear record and repeated statements on my part that was *not* what I was talking about, and that what I *was* talking about was federal funding for public affairs programming. It a, that I would cast... that I was for the elimination of public affairs programming on Public television. Which, you know, I *wasn't* for it.

Quite frankly I don't think that's what anyone or I don't think very many people thought that's what public television or educational television was all about, and I thought the commercial networks did an ample job with public affairs. But it did seem to me that removing the federal funding would take away a lot of the political irritation that Irving said, that if all

we're doing is drama and arts and events and so forth, that's not the kind of stuff, at least at that time we didn't have pit (?) price and things like that, but that's not the kind of stuff that creates political controversy, and that's not the kind of stuff that's going to cause a lot of difficulties in the funding process.

Interviewer: Why do you think the public broadcasters were so committed to the use of public funds for, you know, for the news and public affairs? I mean, what's, what's really going on?

Clay Whitehead: What's really going on is very simple. You have a relatively small group of people who think they have, I don't know what they have, but who thought they had, I mean, put myself back in that time, a small group of people who thought they had a concept for the country, culturally, politically, that needed to be advanced, and that agenda was in part a, a higher tone of entertainment programming, running more towards the arts, and a higher, more intellectual tone of public affairs programming, albeit with a very pronounced political bias and political agenda, to teach the American people what the right way was to look at these... at public affairs. It was a very preachy kind of thing.

“We, we know what's right, and finally, you know, we're not going to have preaching from the government to worry about; we're not going to have the, the kind of heathen, tasteless, commercial broadcasters. We, free of all these messy constraints, are going to put forth the true message. And that includes public affairs.” It was just that simple.

Interviewer: And when you say 'we,' is it the Eastern establishment you characterize or how would you characterize the 'we' who were preaching then?

Clay Whitehead: 'We' were the Ford Foundation and WGBH, WQED, KCET was the west coast member. WETA here. It was a relatively small group of people. To

be fair to them, I don't think, I don't think that all of them, all of the time, thought that that's what they were doing. I think they really did believe that what they were going to do was apolitical and was informational.

They, they would from time to time, when Colson would fly off the handle and they would say something about the company, like, "How can you think that they would do that? I think, how can, how can you think that we have a political agenda? There's no one here but us chickens. Why is, why is everyone so upset? I mean, if we were Democrats in there we'd be doing the same thing." And I think to some extent some of them believed it. Others of them didn't believe it for a minute; they knew exactly what they were doing. There was a, as the Administration wore on, as Watergate came to the fore, there was a, very clearly a strong desire to get Nixon. They never liked him at the outset. Especially after I got through with them. They didn't like him.

Interviewer: Do you think it was an East Coast/West Coast thing, really?

Clay Whitehead: No. No, I think it was a.... I think it was more of a philosophical establishment thing. KCET and KQED were part of it. But the.... I would argue that the people in those two stations were not representative of the middle or the western part of the United States. They were a kind of a West Coast bastion of publicly-stated East Coast snobbery.

But I, I don't think it's, I don't think it's very healthy to think of this in a geographical sense; I think of it more as a tide of philosophical events.

Interviewer: Because there's one of the things... when I was going through the papers that the Nixons have was how good Nixon was to Hollywood in, in terms of, there was a guy at Universal, who wasn't Bill Watson and who was, I forget his name now but, the other head of Universal, who threw all these

letters and things back and forth and the Prime Time Access Rule benefited Hollywood, Sin Sin (?) benefited Hollywood.

In other words, Hollywood... Actually, I would think, what would, what will never be admitted publicly was the movie industry in the '70s benefited from the Nixon Presidency.

Clay Whitehead: Jules Stein.

Interviewer: It was Jules Stein?

Clay Whitehead: Stein was a very active liaison within that community and the Nixon White House.

Interviewer: And, and that's just sort of ironic to me. I mean, in other words that, there wasn't, there didn't seem to be any loggerheads between the movie industry and Nixon?

Clay Whitehead: No, there wasn't.

Interviewer: Is that because he was a Southern Californian or . . . ? I mean I didn't under-, it was just interesting to . . . ; it just was fascinating.

Clay Whitehead: I don't know. I don't think that Hollywood at that time was as liberal as it is today. I don't think. Maybe. I just don't know. But also, remember that Hollywood was the source of the television programming for the commercial networks. And to the extent that we wanted to erode the power of the three commercial networks, we wanted to encourage more outlets for the Hollywood products. It wasn't that the Hollywood guys were our buddies, it was that we wanted more outlets for their products. We wanted more competition. And the bottleneck was not in the production of the programming, the bottleneck was in the distribution.

So, it was inevitable that the Hollywood crowd and we, to the extent that we had a common enemy, should be friends after a fashion. I remember once I had a discussion with Norman Lear, and he was typically and refreshingly frank. He said, “Look, the networks are ugly. They’re mean. And I’ll do anything I can to help you cut them down to size. But, I won’t help you with your, your ‘bias in public television’ issue. I don’t agree with you on that. I won’t, I won’t, I won’t blast them in public, the three commercial networks, but I’ll do everything I can to chop them down behind the scenes.”

Interviewer: Politics makes strange bedfellows.

Clay Whitehead: Exactly. Yeah.

Interviewer: So, overall then, you left all of these issues behind after you left the White House, it was just a....

Clay Whitehead: Yeah, it kind of played out in, in a way it was, it was my swan song. This is probably not of interest, as much as anything else, but I had worked very hard to piece together this kind of compromise that I thought.... We had been endorsing, as I told you, five-year funding, and, as a pure political ploy, the Congress, which I guess was in ’72, came up with two-year funding.

And I argued that that wasn’t long-term funding, and that we should continue to press for our compromise of more structural checks and balances and longer term funding, and that if we agreed to two-year funding, we’re obviously just giving up on the battle. And, the Cong-, the CPB crowd would just be constantly working with the Congress to up and up and up the ante and that just wasn’t a healthy arrangement.

So, I was the one who recommended that we.

Interviewer: Oh, you personally recommended it then?

Clay Whitehead: I wrote the WETA (?) Bill.

Interviewer: Oh, I see. I didn't know about that.

Clay Whitehead: And the, the rationale was that we wanted to persevere and go directions that I'd been talking about. So, we, we said that that wasn't long-term funding, and we weren't going to be part of it. Between '72 and '74 I continued to work to do what I could for PBS. We made some appointments to the board of CPB and we, things began to change and, and some of the initial confusion began to sort out.

The public broadcasting crowd began to lose, realize that some of their dreams were not going to be a reality. At least, that seemed to happen. So, they became a little more realistic. The local stations began to realize that, indeed, being spoon-fed all this programming from CPB was making up their programming, but they weren't going to be able to sell it, and sell their interest.

So, there was a more pragmatic environment for having discussions. And my message was, to the public broadcasting community was, "Look, you guys get your house in order with some kind of reasonable checks and balances here, and we will support five-year funding." And in, by 1974 I, I can't remember exactly what the events were, but I became convinced that what we had in, in terms of the way CPB worked and the way the local stations worked was tolerable, and that we, we ought to go ahead and recommend five-year funding.



So, I wrote a memo to the President that said that. That this was as good as we were going to get, and that this is tolerable for the long run and it's in our interests, as well as the public's interest, to have five-year funding. Let's just do it. And the President came back and said, "No."

And I think it was, I think it, in part that he was so pissed off with them about Watergate and in part because he was, at that time he was probably having very basic considerations about his life, and, you know, why do I need to give money to these guys; they never did anything for me.

Interviewer: Sure.

Clay Whitehead: And probably also in part just he wasn't focusing on anything, you know.

I, I was really pissed, because I felt like I had, this wasn't my number one issue. It consumed an awful lot of my time and energy. It put me in a very high profile position politically that I didn't relish, and I felt like I'd really gone out on a limb to make something happen here, and my own President was sawing it off and letting me fall.

Because I had, I felt like I had put myself on the line saying that if these changes are made, then we will support you. I mean, it was a personal thing, as well as an Administration matter. So, I went back to the President and said, "I'm not going to back down. Hey, I want to talk to the President." And as soon as I came back, the President was too busy. End of story.

And I had been hanging around at that point.... I, I was really wanting to get out of town. I had been hanging around just to kind of close this issue up. In fact, earlier that year I had worked out my deal with Saxton on the ATT thing. I'd done that. The cable television thing was kind of headed

in the right direction. I really want to kind of close this off, you know, and get the hell out of town.

And there was another personal thing in my life. I had been asked by Gerry Ford's lawyer to plan the Ford transition...

Interviewer: Oh, I see.

Clay Whitehead: ...while Nixon was still President, and while I was still in the Nixon administration. So, I was saying that I had some personal anguish about what was I doing here? Was I living where I wanted to be living? What am I doing? For a whole bunch of reasons I just wanted to get out, and then I was really pissed.

So, I went to the *New York Times*, and I said, "Here's the story." And the President, basically I said that if things worked out, then we'd do long-term financing, and the President disapproved it. And the next morning there it was on the front page of *The New York Times*. "The President has rejected Whitehead's proposal for long-term financing for Public Broadcasting."

And Ron Ziegler stood up.... It was, it wasn't the number one story, but it was a big front page story at the time, and provoked a lot of questioning at the press conference that day and Ziegler stood up and lied through his teeth. He said, "No way. The President has not made a decision on that," you know. "The story is all wrong. There is nothing to it."

And then they called me, but Ron Zeigler was being.... As far as I know he's the only human being in my adult lifetime that I've refused to speak to, so Brian Lamb took the call, and I said, "Look, guys..." I said, "If the President hasn't made a decision then I want to talk about it." I went back and talked to Al Haig one more time and I said "Al, this is really

stupid. Number one, this is a good solid thing from a policy point of view. Number two, you know, if you just don't want to do it politically, you don't need this kind of heat politically about Nixon trying to kill public television. This is a good solid thing and, you know, I would like to talk to the President about it." And Al said basically, "He's in no mood, but I'll see what I can do."

And, so I wrote another memo. As I recall, Haig and the President were going off somewhere. I think they were going to Europe, but I'm not really sure. Anyway, Al said, "I'll get him on the plane and I'll give him some numbers, you know write me one paragraph." And Al called back and said, "Go with it." You know, "The President's approved this." So, I put together the Presidential message and the proposed bill for five-year funding, went up and testified before Senator Pastore and that was, that was in the morning. I came back that afternoon, I wrote my letter of resignation, and that was it.

Interviewer: Thank you. You mentioned Brian Lamb. He went on to found CSPAN. How did that relate to your vision of what Public Broadcasting was supposed to be? Because I noticed, I mean, was this something that he was involved with as well?

Clay Whitehead: Well, in, Brian was my assistant for press and legislative liaison. We never thought of CSPAN at the time. That was one of Brian's ideas after we both left government. I remember when he first told me about it I told him I thought it was kind of silly. I didn't see how it was ever going to be successful.

But it set, in the sense that when you do have, when you remove the bottleneck on the distribution, which cable television did, then you can't predict what's going to come out the other end. There are all kinds of

things that people want to see and that people want to produce, that it's hard to anticipate in advance.

I, I love to talk about what I call the Thoreau Effect in communications. It comes from the passage in *Walden* where the reporter goes out and interviews the great man and says, "Thoreau, tell me what you think about this fabulous new electric telegraph cable that runs from Maine to Texas." Thoreau replied that he wasn't sure that the people of Maine had anything to say to the people of Texas.

And I've always liked that as, as a kind of a metaphor for the fact that before you put in place a new medium of communications, the people will almost always say, why would I want to do that? How would I use that? I mean you see it more recently, some of the cable companies announced that they were going to adopt a new video technology to expand to 500 channels.

Well, the first thing that pops out, is on the front page of the *Style* section [of the *Washington Post*], something that pokes fun at what five hundred channels of television would be like. Which was good fun, but it just points out that television with say, thirty or forty channels, the way we have today, is quite different from television of three or four channels, and in ways that none of us would have predicted that.

And none of us now can, can say what television is going to look like with 500 channels. We just, we just can't see that. So, CSPAN is, is an outgrowth of, I think, the idea that you open up the channels for distribution, a lot of unpredictable things will pop through. And I think that's one of the most constructive.

Interviewer: What about Hartford Gunn? Did you deal with him and what was that like and did you play any role in his selection as head of PBS or how did that come about?

Clay Whitehead: I don't remember. I did know Hartford. I worked with him. I certainly didn't select him. I don't remember if I expressed any opinion one way or the other.

Interviewer: So, was he antagonistic towards the Nixon Administration?

Clay Whitehead: No, no. Hartford, I thought, was a good, solid guy who was just trying to do his job. I don't think he had any particular grief for the Nixon administration or him. I never sensed it. He seemed to me just a workmanlike guy.

Interviewer: Did you have any dealings with Fred Friendly or Moyers or any of those?

Clay Whitehead: Friendly. I never, never, to my knowledge, ever met Moyers.

Interviewer: And what was.... Any anecdote about Friendly at all?

Clay Whitehead: Not that I remember. I remember spending a lot of time with him. Hard not to like Fred. A very likeable kind of guy.

Interviewer: He was lobbying, he would come down to...

Clay Whitehead: He was involved in.... I can't remember any specific names, to tell you the truth. He was around and promoting the CPB point of view.

Interviewer: And what about, I mean you, you, didn't you have a Price [John] Macey as head of CPB. He resigned and so forth?

Clay Whitehead: Pace resigned and . . .

Interviewer: Pace resigned?

Clay Whitehead: Yeah. And . . .

Interviewer: Trillian came on or something like that?

Clay Whitehead: I forgot.

Interviewer: Loomis!

Clay Whitehead: Henry Loomis. Pace resigned.... Pace came to me and offered to resign, basically saying, well, you know, "I'm a Democrat and the President ought to have somebody as the Chairman of his board who he's comfortable with. If he wants me to stay, I'd be happy to stay, but I think he's entitled to the best Chairman. Just let me know what you want to do." So, we decided we'd take him up on it. Macey, I don't remember the, I don't remember the circumstances about exactly why and when he quit, but Loomis was someone that we recommended.

Interviewer: But was he able to do anything? I mean....

Clay Whitehead: I don't think so. My, my recollection was that he was kind of co-opted by the public broadcasting establishment, and he was never very effectual in those areas.

Interviewer: Overall, if you had it all to do over again, what might you have done differently in dealing with the Public Broadcasting?

Clay Whitehead: Let someone else handle it. I think it's one of those no-win situations. There're, there are too many, too many cross-currents, and I think it's

very hard for anyone to play a very constructive and effectual role. It's, it's relatively easy to take one side or the other. Pat Buchanan would say, "Wrong thing for the government to fund. We've got to zero it out, and that's that."

The public broadcasting people would say that all this is absolute necessity, and we need to be sure there's an electronic medium lives up to its full potential to reflect the arts and blah, blah, blah, blah. And, you know, both of those are fine statements in so far as they go. And you can develop, tight, sound arguments both ways. The minute you get in between those two, you're just asking to be chewed up. Probably not the answer you wanted.

Interviewer: Oh, it was very interesting. Where is it, anything else, so. After Nixon left they moved the Office of Telecommunications Policy out of the White House to the Commerce Department and down below stairs.

Clay Whitehead: Yeah, it's, that was Carter.

Interviewer: Why do you think that happened?

Clay Whitehead: Carter, as I understand it, thought that would be a easy [unintelligible] for the broadcasters.

Interviewer: The broadcasters didn't like it because it was running cable?

Clay Whitehead: And I don't, the story I'd been told was that Carter thought that by breaking this up he would be able to save Public Broadcasting. Broadcasters, it turned out, didn't like the idea. They very much wanted a strong Executive Branch counterpart to the FCC, because we could do things; we could analyze issues; we could make decisions and do things the FCC could never do.

We could focus the FCC agenda; break down some barriers. But even though we and they, we in broadcast frequently disagree, OTP was a forum where people could come and talk, work things out, not that they could always win. But, anyway, I think that was Carter's perception. And so, he took the policy part of it and moved that to Commerce.

He moved the, most of the oversight of the federal government telecommunications and the international part of it. It wasn't so much downgrading the office that was a mistake; it was really the fragmentation of those functions. And today we're right back where we were in the Johnson Administration. We do not have anyone in the Executive Branch who can take the broad perspective on communications policy issues.

Interviewer: Why do you think that the Reagan and Bush administrations, they didn't move aggressively on that?

Clay Whitehead: It was in part that they didn't, they didn't want to, they didn't want to go back to the OTP structure of having it in the White House. It doesn't really fit into that kind of a need to have solutions. But I don't think anyone wanted to do such a high profile thing as to create a new office in the Executive Office of the President and, and recreate that all over again.

But for a Republican President to do that would inevitably recall all of the political turmoil associated with some of the high profile issues when I was there. So, I think it would have been a counter-productive thing to recommend. And also in part because the, I think the, the, the Reagan and Bush administrations, unlike the Nixon administration, were relatively more comfortable with the business status quo.

And I might say with some good reason. By the time Reagan and even Bush got there, cable had grown. Cable was now thriving and had gotten



to the point where we had to think about some checks and balances on it. Whereas, when I was there we were just worried about making sure they would survive. All kind of these [unintelligible] ATT was broken up.

So, there just wasn't, you know.... Competition has been pretty successfully injected into the communications system on both the television side and the telecom services side. Public broadcasting is not a major factor in the public discourse; it's not a major factor in funding. It's not a major irritant or problem. So, I don't, I just don't think that there are any huge issues that argue the course. So that's where we are.

Interviewer: Well, thank you very much.

**End of recording.**